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# Victory in S. Vietnam Doubted in CIA Paper Disavowed as Policy

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI)—High Administration officials said Saturday that a Central Intelligence Agency document declaring that victory over the Communists in South Vietnam is doubtful and that eventually it may be necessary to make a "neutralization" deal, does not represent U. S. policy.

The 45-page paper, prepared by Willard Matthias of CIA's Board of National Estimates, attempts to assess development in various parts of the world within the framework of the Soviet-American power relationship.

## APPROVED BY AGENCY

It was written early this year. It has been circulated among various Government agencies with a notation that it had "general approval" of the CIA board which had, however, made no attempt "to reach complete agreement on every point of it."

Administration officials were obviously disturbed by the possible political implications of the document at this time inasmuch as Republican Presidential nominee Barry M. Goldwater is charging them with a "no win" foreign policy.

They said they wanted to emphasize that the paper had never been presented to or considered by President Johnson's National Security Council nor the top level U. S. Intelligence estimate board.

## 'ONE MAN'S OPINION'

Official sources disclosed existence of the document when they learned it had been offered for publication as a major outline of American policy. They asserted that this was not true and that the ideas were, as one official put it, "only one man's opinion."

Aside from the Vietnam neutralization reference, the document appeared to be a routine summary of the obvious changes brought about by the nuclear stalemate of terror between Russia and the United States, complicated by the Red Chinese-Soviet ideological conflict.

The fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States now have the nuclear capability to destroy each other "has not only depreciated the value of strategic power in the achievement of particular objectives; it has also come to circumscribe the use of other instruments of military power," the CIA paper says.

## LIMITS OF POWER

"It has become increasingly difficult for either of the great powers to project its military power in conventional form into other areas of the world or into disputes which may arise."

The paper adds:

With the big powers increasingly inhibited from "brandishing their strategic capabilities and projecting their conventional ones," the "secondary and minor powers" such as France, Egypt, and Indonesia, have taken the opportunity to strengthen their arsenals and try to play a greater role in international affairs.

Matthias wrote that "a nuclear capability in the hands of other than the two great powers is a nuisance and a potential troublemaker, but it is not much of a factor in the world balance of military power or indeed in the respect accorded to its possessors."